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1
Mergers often prove not to be as pro￿table as announced in the pre-merger declarations
(Cabral, 2002 and Scherer and Ross, 1990). If in the real world mergers do not increase the
pro￿ts of the merging parties then explanations given by economic theory are not suitable
to describe the phenomenon fully. This paper focuses on vertical mergers which occur
when an intermediate-good producer and a ￿nal-good producer merge into a single ￿rm.
Vertical integration is usually explained in terms of technological synergies (e.g. scale or
scope economies, input customisation and production coordination externalities) or in terms
of market structure and interaction (e.g. double marginalisation, transaction costs, incomplete
contracts and market foreclosure).
Our aim is to analyse the purely strategic incentives for vertical mergers. We therefore
present a simple model abstracting from all the traditional motives, in which vertical
integration is neither pro￿table nor harmful per se. Yet the fact that it is the unique equilibrium
of the model adds purely strategic incentives to the list of explanations of mergers.
In our model symmetric vertical integration is the unique equilibrium if entry in the
intermediate-good market by vertically integrated ￿rms is observable by competitors. This is
not a remote hypothesis as many real-world institutions allow for observable market entry. If,
for example, a ￿rm operates in an internet-based market and does not supply certain products
on its website, then everyone can observe that the ￿rm’s main objective is not to maximise the
sale of these goods. Alternatively, the agglomeration of production activities in given locations
may allow for direct observation of the nature of the output of a ￿rm’s plants. Finally, many
￿rms regularly meet at least once a year ￿ but generally more often ￿ in business fairs where
each of the participants can observe the range of products sold by its competitors.
2
1 This paper is a revised version of Vergara Caffarelli (2004) and it is based on the second chapter of my PhD
dissertation. I thank Karl Schlag, Paolo Guerrieri, Stefen Huck, Antonella Ianni, Massimo Motta and Jacques-
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2 Note that the last two conditions are frequently met by small and medium-sized enterprises as they are
often localised in certain geographic locations (the so-called industrial districts) and they are also involved in
business fairs.8
This paper analyses a merge-and-compete game with four players: two upstream ￿rms
and two downstream ￿rms. Each vertical pair can either be integrated or not. Integration
occurs if a downstream ￿rm takes over one of the upstream suppliers. The game-form is as
follows. Downstream ￿rms ￿rst decide whether or not to buy out one of the upstream ￿rms,
anticipating the effect of such a decision on competition in the ￿nal-good market. Then, if
vertically integrated, a ￿rm chooses whether to sell on the market both the intermediate and
the ￿nal good or the ￿nal product only. Finally, production and competition take place both
upstream and downstream. Downstream ￿rms compete in quantities while upstream ￿rms are
price setters. While vertical integration is always observed, both cases of observable and of
unobservable entry in the intermediate-good market are studied separately.
We analyse the merge-and-compete game by backward induction. The subgames,
called con￿gurations, are determined by plant property structure. These are the dispersed
con￿guration (each plant is an independent ￿rm), the vertically integrated duopoly, and the
two asymmetric con￿gurations each consisting of one vertically integrated entity and of two
independent ￿rms. Note that the two asymmetric con￿gurations can be reduced to one by
symmetry, so that one only needs to analyse three subgames.
In all con￿gurations all four plants produce a positive quantity in equilibrium (and
all the goods are produced in all con￿gurations). In the dispersed and in the asymmetric
con￿gurations there exists a market for the intermediate good. In the duopoly, however, the
intermediate good is only produced within each ￿rm and transferred from the upstream to the
downstream division.
Upstream technology exhibits constant returns to scale and only requires labour input.
Moreover, upstream ￿rms are price-setters and hence compete in prices (￿ la Bertrand). The
￿nal good is horizontally differentiated between the downstream producers which compete ￿
la Cournot (Singh and Vives, 1984). Downstream plants employ a convex, constant-returns-
to-scale technology that does not allow for total substitution of one production factor with
the other. Finally, the labour market is perfectly competitive and ￿rms compete to employ (a
given supply of) homogenous workers. The appendix discusses the case of a labour market
characterised by the presence of a monopolist trade union.
The results of the paper are the characterisation of the equilibria of the merge-and-
compete game. The assumptions on production technologies and on the structure of market9
competition imply that ￿rms are indifferent about symmetric vertical (dis)integration. Thus
the crucial part of the analysis is the case in which only one of the downstream ￿rms vertically
integrates while the other does not. In this asymmetric con￿guration subgame there are only
three ￿rms in the market. The intermediate-market entry decision of the vertically integrated
entity depends on observability of this choice.
In the observable-entry scenario the vertical ￿rm abstains from selling the intermediate
good because the independent upstream ￿rm can observe such a choice and so behaves as
a monopolist on the intermediate market. This is pro￿table for the integrated ￿rm which
then competes in the ￿nal market with a ￿rm that has higher costs than itself. Needless to
say, this is also pro￿table for the independent intermediate-good producer. Therefore in the
observability scenario the unique equilibrium of the game is symmetric vertical integration.
Such a Nash equilibrium is also strict. In the asymmetric case the vertically integrated entity is
strictly better off than the independent downstream ￿rm and the payoffs players receive in both
symmetric con￿gurations are equal and lie between those of the asymmetric con￿guration.
This establishes the strategic incentives for vertical integration as it is dominant to integrate
with a supplier when entry is observable.
Indeed, vertical mergers are pro￿table because they harm the opponent in the
downstream market who will face higher input prices after the exit of one ￿rm in the upstream
market. An example of this has already been given by Adams and Dirlam (1964) in a study
of the US steel industry. The logic of the current analysis is close to foreclosure models.
However, these models focus on situations in which independent downstream ￿rms’ access
to the intermediate-good producer (or at least to the ef￿cient one) is blocked by vertical
integration of a competitor. The current approach stresses the effects of market power in the
intermediate-good market when ￿rms are all equally ef￿cient.
The equilibrium of the asymmetric con￿guration changes if entry in the intermediate-
good market is not observable: in this case both upstream plants sell the intermediate good
at the competitive price in equilibrium. This is because the vertical ￿rm cannot resist the
temptation of stealing the market from the independent upstream ￿rm, if the independent
intermediate-good producer prices above marginal cost. Consequently, in this scenario
downstream ￿rms are indifferent as to whether they should vertically integrate or not.10
Some interesting implications for competition policy and merger control can be drawn
from the results. The EU Commission would either prohibit the merger or impose remedies
eliminating the strategic incentives for vertical integration found in the model. In the US,
however, the Department of Justice would not intervene and the incentives would remain.
The model is built in order to avoid the occurrence of the standard justifying motives
for vertical integration.
3 Indeed, there are no increasing returns of scale and no economies of
scope. Double marginalisation (Spengler, 1950) is not a relevant issue since upstream ￿rms
compete in prices. Moreover, contracts are complete and vertical integration does not lead to
any pro￿t-increasing effect such as quality enhancements through input customisation or cost-
saving effects due to a reduction in transaction costs or to better coordination in the production
process (the so-called just-in-time production). Finally, the presence of two intermediate-good
producers prevents incentives to foreclose the input market from determining the choice of
vertical integration. Yet vertical integration is the unique equilibrium in the case of observable
entry.
In the industrial organisation literature most of the research efforts have been devoted to
the analysis of the anti-competitive reasons and effects of vertical integration such as market
foreclosure. This stream of research has been excellently reviewed by Motta (2003) and Rey
and Tirole (2003). A recent paper by Nocke and White (2005) suggests that vertical merges
facilitate collusion in the upstream market. Even if anti-competitive behaviour is a major
concern in industrial organisation, Grossman and Helpman’s (2002) analysis abstracts from
this issue in order to focus on integration synergies due to input customisation. In general,
in a world with incomplete contracts vertical integration is a solution to the hold-up problem
(Williamson, 1975 and 1985) and may lead to ef￿cient investment (Grossman and Hart, 1986
and Maness, 1996).
4
Acemoglu et al. (2004) study both theoretically and empirically the effect of technology
and technical change on vertical integration. Their ￿ndings include that incentives to vertically
integrate depend on the relative technology intensity of the downstream sector with respect to
the upstream one and are consistent with incomplete-contract theories.
3 Lieberman (1991) empirically investigates the determinants of vertical intergration.
4 See also the surveys by Joskow (2005) and by Whinston (2001).11
Horn and Wolinsky (1988) focus on a similar model to the one analysed here. A duopoly
supplies an intermediate good to a duopoly which then sells to ￿nal consumers. However, their
analysis concerns horizontal mergers and is centred on the assumption that input-suppliers and
downstream ￿rms are locked in a bilateral monopoly and hence bargain on input-prices.
Salinger (1988) analyses an industry with two stages of production and Cournot
oligopoly both upstream and downstream. In the equilibrium vertical mergers can either cause
an increase or a decrease in both the intermediate- and the ￿nal-good price depending on
parameter values. Salinger’s (1988) insightful paper does not, however, address the incentives
for vertical integration in a strategic manner although it provides a comparative static analysis
on the number of vertically integrated ￿rms that operate in the industry.
Economides (2005) analyses vertical integration in a two-stage Bertrand duopoly, in
which intermediate goods are complement and ￿nal products substitute. Incentives for vertical
integration depend on the level of complementarity and substitutability of the goods.
The current paper also relates to the ￿raising rivals’ costs￿ literature such as Sibley and
Weisman (1998). This ￿eld of research studies the strategies that one ￿rm may implement in
order to induce its competitors to face higher costs, thus gaining a competitive advantage over
them. Here, though, the cost asymmetry is not due to any direct action of any of the competing
￿rms.
Industrial districts
5 are a ￿eld in which the hypotheses of this paper might be easily
satis￿ed. Interestingly, a phase of both vertical and horizontal mergers has been predicted
(Brusco et al., 1996 and Nuti and Cainelli, 1996) and is now being observed in Italy (Becattini,
1998; Brioschi et al., 2002; Dei Ottati, 1996; Withford, 2001). Models of industrial districts
are proposed by Souberayn, Thisse and Weber (1999 and 2002). New economic geography
6
singles out the reasons for the aggregation of similar ￿rms in the same location (Krugman,
1991).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the model
and discusses the assumptions. Sections 3, 4 and 5 respectively analyse the equilibrium
5 See Banca d’Italia (2005), Becattini (1990) and Signorini (2000). The large world-wide diffusion of
industrial districts is documented by Bagella and Becchetti (1999), Pyke et al. (1990) and Vergara Caffarelli
(2003).
6 See Baldwin et. al. (2002), part I, and the survey by Ottaviano (2000).12
in the dispersed con￿guration, in the vertically integrated duopoly and in the asymmetric
con￿guration. The complete merge-and-compete game is solved in Section 6. Section 7
presentssomepolicyimplicationsofthemodelandSection8concludes. Anappendixanalyses
the case of a monopolist trade union.
2. The Model
As said in the introduction there are four plants, two upstream and two downstream.
Downstream plants produce the ￿nal good qi combining labour li and the intermediate good
yi according to a concave, constant-returns-to-scale production function f (li;yi) that does
not allow for total factor substitution. Labour employed downstream is paid a wage w and
the price of the intermediate good is ￿. Let C (w;￿;qi) be the cost function associated
with the production function f (li;yi). By the constant-returns-to-scale assumptions on the
production technology the cost function is homogenous of degree one in the output, as well
as homogenous of degree one in the factor prices. So it can be written as C (w;￿;qi) =
qiC (w;￿;1) = qic(w;￿). The function c(￿;￿) is homogenous of degree one in its two







Final goods are horizontally differentiated and the demand function for each good is
pi = a￿bqi ￿vqj, where i = 1;2, j 6= i and b > v > 0 (Singh and Vives, 1984). So the pro￿t
function of downstream plant i is:
￿i (qi;qj;w;￿) = aqi ￿ bq
2
i ￿ vqiqj ￿ qic(w;￿) (2)
Upstream plants produce their output indicated by tn for n = 1;2 with a constant-
returns-to-scale technology. The only market for upstream ￿rms’ output is the intermediate-
good market generated by the conditional factor demands of the downstream plants. Upstream
￿rms’ only input is labour and hence they use a linear production function: tn = h￿n where
h > 0 is the marginal and average productivity of labour and ￿n represents the labour13
employed in upstream plant n = 1;2. Indicating the wage in the upstream sector with !
the cost function of each upstream plant is cn (!;tn) = (!=h)tn.
To close the model it is necessary to analyse the labour market. Let us assume that
insider workers are endowed with industry-speci￿c skills so that the total labour supply L is
￿xed. Workers from outside cannot compete (in the short run) with insiders because they lack
the necessary training. However, insiders supply homogenous labour to the four plants and are
perfectly mobile. The labour market is characterised by perfect competition.
In the examples used below to illustrate the results downstream plants employ a Cobb-




i for i = 1;2 and ￿ 2 [0;1] which satis￿es all the assumptions






w￿￿1￿￿qi. For the sake of simplicity ￿ is set equal to 1
2,
hence c(w;￿;qi) = 2qi
p
w￿.
Let us now turn to the structure of the strategic interaction of the players. The order of
the moves of the merge-and-compete game is as follows: I) downstream ￿rms simultaneously
choose whether to integrate or not with their own supplier; the vertical integration decision is
observed; II) if vertically integrated then each ￿rm decides whether to enter the intermediate-
good market in addition to in-house production; III) upstream production takes place and
upstream ￿rms simultaneously set the price for the intermediate good; IV) ￿nally, downstream
production and quantity-competition take place. The main point of the current analysis is
the effect on the equilibrium of different assumptions concerning the observability (by the
competitors) of intermediate-good market entry by a vertically integrated ￿rm.
In the dispersed con￿guration each plant is an independent ￿rm. Downstream ￿rms
compete ￿ la Cournot while upstream ￿rms are price-setters and compete ￿ la Bertrand.
Downstream ￿rms are price-takers in the intermediate-good market. Whenever a pair of ￿rms
vertically integrates the upstream division transfers the intermediate good to the downstream
plant at marginal cost. If the upstream division of an integrated entity enters the market for the
intermediate input then it behaves as a price-setter.
In the model vertical integration is necessary because neither side of the intermediate-
good market can exercise any market power on the other. For instance, it is impossible for14
upstream ￿rms to use non-linear pricing schemes such as a franchise fee
7 and downstream
buyer(s) cannot open a bargaining phase with the seller(s) in bilateral monopoly fashion.
Examples of vertical relations similar to the current model may be found in
the automotive industry between part-suppliers and car-producers, in the apparel (or
fashion) industry between textile- and clothing-producers, in the ceramic industry between
intermediate- and ￿nal-good producers and in electricity generation. In these cases, while
producinganecessaryinputfordownstream￿rms, upstreamsuppliersareintoughcompetition
with each other as intermediate goods are highly homogenous. Indeed, in these sectors vertical
integration has occurred. Some fashion houses like Missoni and Dolce & Gabbana produce
both clothing and (at least partially) fabrics. In the automotive sector FIAT owns Magneti
Marelli (a component producer) and in the ceramic sector the Marazzi Group ￿ originating
from the ceramic district of Sassuolo ￿ developed through a process of vertical integration.
Finally, Joskow (1985) reports that mine-mouth electricity generation plants are six-times
more likely to own the coal mine located next to them than non-mine-mouth competitors.
8
It might seem that our model is based on too many speci￿c assumptions on production
technologies and competition structure. However, these assumptions are necessary in order to
correctly focus on the desired effects.
Bertrand competition upstream is necessary to abstract from double marginalisation
which would otherwise be suf￿cient to set strong incentives for vertical integration.
9 Cournot
competition downstream can be argued along the lines of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) as
the reduced form of a game of price-competition with previous choice of capacities. Final-
product differentiation is motivated by the fact that in the real world goods are differentiated
and homogeneity is a limit case.
The assumption on the type of competition in the intermediate-good market deserves
further attention. Indeed, alternative market structures would induce double marginalisation
thus reinforcing the incentives for vertical integration.
10 Actually, in a setup where upstream
7 See Motta (2003), p. 411 ff. and Tirole (1988), p. 170 ff..
8 See also Pint and Baldwin (1997), ch. 3, pg. 15.
9 See Spengler (1950), Motta (2003), p. 419 ff. and Tirole (1988), p. 174 ff..
10 As noted, Salinger (1988) discusses the case of vertical mergers in a two-stage Cournot oligopoly, ￿nding15
producers make positive pro￿ts one could explicitly model the market for corporate control.
In particular, downstream ￿rms would be required to pay a positive price to merge. The price
would then account both for the strategic effects found in the paper and for the bene￿ts of
eliminating double marginalisation.
Let us now move on to the discussion of the hypotheses about production technologies.
The stronger assumption is clearly that the downstream technology is convex and does not
allow for the total substitution of one production factor with another. These technologies have
the important property that the solution of the ￿rm’s maximisation problem is internal because
a strictly positive output can only be produced with strictly positive quantities of all (in the
speci￿c case both) inputs. This condition implies that the system of four plants is viable, i.e.
it is a genuine multistage production process in which it is not possible to totally substitute
one factor with another. Total input substitution would be neither realistic nor sound: a corner
solution means that downstream ￿rms either use only the intermediate good (which is not
realistic) or only labour (which implies that in equilibrium upstream ￿rms do not operate).
The further assumption of constant returns to scale is introduced to abstract from the scale
factor so that the results can only be attributed to the different assumptions on market entry
observability.
The existence of two plants that supply the intermediate good prevents anti-competitive
incentives (for example foreclosure) from determining the vertical integration decision.
Finally, the labour market is introduced so that the model describes a closed production system
whose end market is the rest of the world. It also adds neatness to the model as the equilibrium
of the dispersed con￿guration, of the duopoly, and of the observable-entry scenario of the
asymmetric con￿guration is easily determined parametrically in the wage.
Lastly, it is necessary to address the issue of entry of new ￿rms into the industry. It is
assumed that entry cannot take place. This ￿nal assumption can be justi￿ed by setting the time
horizon of the model to the short run. The very de￿nition of short-term analysis prescribes
that the number of ￿rms in the market is given. Moreover, barriers to entry may remain in the
that no unambiguous prediction may be drawn as to the effect of integration on the price of the ￿nal good.
Likewise, Economides (2005) shows that in a two-stage Bertrand olygopoly, in which ￿nal goods are substitute
and intermediate products complement, integration incentives are non-monotonic in goods’ complementarity and
substitutability.16
long run if there exist high sunk costs for the establishment of new ￿rms in the industry. This
frequently happens in the case of highly specialised industries.
Tocompletethisdiscussionitisnecessarytosketchthelong-runequilibrium. Aspointed
out in the introduction, if entry in the intermediate-good market is observable then both ￿rms
vertically integrate in the short-run equilibrium and there is no market for an independent
producer of the intermediate good. Likewise, none of the two vertically integrated entities
has any incentive to sell the intermediate good to an entrant in the production of the ￿nal
good, thus foreclosing the market to any such entrant. Hence, if the number of active ￿rms in
the intermediate-good market is observable no entry of a single ￿rm occurs in the long run.
Nevertheless, if two ￿rms simultaneously enter one upstream and the other downstream, they
will integrate and remain in the market, adding a new vertically integrated entity in the long-
run equilibrium. In the unobservable-entry case ￿rms are indifferent between integrating or
not in the short run. However, the intermediate good is exchanged at its marginal cost. Thus,
in the long run there are no incentives to enter the intermediate-good market as it either does
not exist (in the case of vertical integration) or no pro￿ts are obtainable there (otherwise). If
a ￿rm enters downstream, however, the incumbents will accommodate entry unless they are
vertically integrated.
For the sake of clarity the following three sections analyse each of the subgames
separately: ￿rst, the dispersed con￿guration which is the case when no pair of ￿rms vertically
integrate, then the duopoly that occurs when both pairs integrate simultaneously, and ￿nally
the asymmetric con￿guration in which one vertically integrated entity competes with a chain
of independent ￿rms. Both cases of observable and of unobservable entry in the intermediate-
good market are analysed. Section 6 presents the equilibrium analysis of the whole game.
3. The Dispersed Con￿guration
The four plants correspond to four independent ￿rms (see Figure 1 below).
Consider ￿rst the (differentiated) ￿nal-good market. To calculate the Cournot





















which are the equilibrium quantities. The pro￿ts of both Cournot competitors are identical:
￿




















Figure 1: Dispersed con￿guration









@￿c(w;￿) which are homogenous of
degree zero. Recalling the function ￿(w=￿) de￿ned in equation (1) let us rewrite the labour
demand as li (w;￿;q￿
d) = q￿







Knowing the conditional factor demand for the intermediate good we can calculate not
only the equilibrium price of the intermediate good (which is the marginal cost) but also the18
equilibrium quantity produced by each of the two upstream ￿rms. Each of them produces







￿￿0 (w=￿). Substituting the upstream marginal cost !=h




Hence the labour demand from the upstream sector is















































Let us now analyse the labour market. As labour is homogenous and perfectly mobile
the equilibrium wage will be unique and equal upstream and downstream. The equilibrium
wage w￿
d is determined by 2q￿
d￿(h)/h = L, i.e. (a ￿ c(w￿
d;￿))/(2b + v) = Lh/(2￿(h))










= a ￿ L
h(2b+v)
2￿(h) (5)
This establishes a ￿rst result:
PROPOSITION 1. Equilibrium wage level in the dispersed con￿guration is given by
equation (5).
Before moving to the analysis of the duopoly con￿guration, let us consider the Cobb-
Douglas production technology case.
Example 1. Assume that downstream production employs a Cobb-Douglas
technology: f (li;yi) =
p






Recall the labour-market equilibrium condition (5). Using the Cobb-Douglas
speci￿cation above it becomes
2
p











4. The Vertically Integrated Duopoly
The vertically integrated production function maps total labour input (employed both in
the upstream and in the downstream plant) into the ￿nal good: qi = F (Li). It is obtained
by plugging the upstream technology into the downstream technology: F (Li) := f (li;h￿i)
and Li = li + ￿i. Recall the assumptions on f (￿;￿): it is concave, exhibits constant returns to
scale and does not allow for total substitution of one production factor with the other. However,
these assumptions do not translate easily into properties of the vertically-integrated-production
function F (￿).












Now consider the cost function. Note that workers receive the same wage upstream and











As before, the Cournot equilibrium is given by the solution of the system of the best
responses R1 (q2) =
a￿vq2￿c(w; w
h)
















and ￿rms’ pro￿ts are ￿￿ = ￿1 (q￿
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Thus the equilibrium wage is determined by L1 (w;q￿





i.e. by (a ￿ c(w;w=h))/2b+v = Lh=(2￿(h)). So the equilibrium wage w￿
D solves the same










= a ￿ L
h(2b+v)
2￿(h) (7)
We have therefore established the following result:
PROPOSITION 2. Equilibrium wage level in the vertically integrated duopoly is given
by equation (7).
A simple comparison between equation (5) and equation (7) leads us to conclude that:
COROLLARY 1. Simultaneous vertical (dis)integration does not affect the market
outcome.
These results are important as they establish the benchmark for the rest of the paper. In
particular, note that the irrelevance result in Corollary 1 is not surprising because the model
abstracts from all the reasons that traditionally give rise to vertically integrated structures such
as increasing returns, scope economies, transaction costs, incomplete contracts, customised
inputs, foreclosure and double marginalisation.21
So far comparison has only been made between symmetric situations where ￿rms are
either both vertically disintegrated or both integrated. However, asymmetric con￿gurations
must also be considered. The result in Corollary 1 might well be only due to symmetry.
Thus, in the next section the asymmetric con￿guration in which one vertically integrated entity
competes with a chain of independent ￿rms is analysed.
5. The Asymmetric Con￿guration
Thecon￿gurationinwhichoneverticallyintegratedentitycompeteswithaverticalchain
of independent ￿rms is referred to as the asymmetric con￿guration. Without loss of generality
assume that d2 and u2 merged in vertically integrated entity D2. The ownership links and
the interactions are depicted in the following Figure 3: the branch that goes from u2 to the
















Figure 3: Asymmetric con￿guration
In the asymmetric con￿guration careful attention must be given to the order of the
moves and to the observability assumptions. The results depend heavily on the different levels
of observability. Let us recall the game form: I) downstream ￿rms simultaneously choose22
whether to integrate or not with their own supplier; the resulting vertical integration is then
observed; II) if vertically integrated then the ￿rm decides whether to enter the intermediate-
good market in addition to in-house production; III) upstream production and competition take
place; and ￿nally IV) downstream production and competition take place. Hence the following
subsections analyse both cases of unobservable and of observable entry in the intermediate-
good market.
5.1 The Unobservable-Entry Case
Assume that the independent upstream ￿rm u1 cannot observe whether or not the
verticallyintegrated￿rmisactiveontheintermediate-goodmarket. Notethatsinceitsdecision
is not observed by the independent intermediate-good producer, D2 cannot credibly commit
not to enter the market. Hence the independent upstream ￿rm behaves as if the vertically
integrated ￿rm had announced that it is entering the market. Such a conjecture is correct as the
vertically integrated entity is actually competing. So both u1 and D2 simultaneously choose
the price for the intermediate good. Simultaneity implies that there are no incentives for either
￿rm to price above the (common) marginal cost. If either ￿rm were pricing above marginal
cost the other would simply slightly undercut it and steal all the market, gaining all the pro￿ts.
If the independent upstream ￿rm prices at marginal cost it makes zero pro￿ts. Moreover,
given u1’s strategy the vertically integrated ￿rm is then indifferent to selling or not selling
to the independent downstream ￿rm d1. However, if D2 decided not to serve the independent
￿nal-good producer, d1 would be subject to the independent upstream ￿rm’s monopoly pricing
(this is the best response of u1 to D2’s action ￿Don’t sell to d1￿). It would then be pro￿table
for D2 to slightly undercut u1 and steal its market share and (almost) all pro￿ts without
(practically) changing its downstream pro￿ts. It is thus the unique equilibrium that both
￿rms sell to d1, competing ￿ la Bertrand and sharing the demand for the intermediate good.
Hence the equilibrium of the market is identical to the one found in the previous symmetric
con￿gurations. This actually means that when the decision of the integrated entity to enter the
market for the intermediate good is unobservable, both ￿rms are indifferent between vertical
integration or disintegration.
PROPOSITION 3. If the intermediate-good-market entry decision of the vertically
integrated entity is not observable, the unique equilibrium in the subgame is that both23
the independent upstream ￿rm and the vertically integrated entity serve the independent
downstream ￿rm pricing the intermediate good at the (common) marginal cost.
PROOF. Let us proceed by backward induction. In the last stage of the subgame
downstream Cournot competition takes place. The reaction functions for the two players are
Rd1 (qD2) =
a￿vqD2￿cd1
2b and RD2 (qd1) =
a￿vqd1￿cD2








and the equilibrium pro￿ts are ￿￿
i = b(q￿
i)
2 for i = d1;D2.
It is now important to observe that there is an asymmetry in the cost structure of the two
competitors: D2 only pays wages (because the upstream division is transferring downstream
the intermediate good at the marginal cost) while d1 pays both wages to workers and the price
of the intermediate good ￿.
In taking the decision whether to supply the independent ￿rm, the vertically integrated
entity has to anticipate the outcome of the Cournot competition. It also anticipates that if it
decides not to sell to d1 then the independent upstream ￿rm acts as a monopolist facing the
inverse demand function ￿ = ’(yd1), which is downward sloping by the law of supply as it









@￿cdi (w;￿) = q￿
d1￿(w=￿) ￿ q￿
d1￿0 (w=￿)w=￿
The monopolist’s problem is
max
t ￿u1 = (’(t) ￿ !=h)t (8)
where ! is the upstream wage level. The solution t0 solves the ￿rst-order condition
’(t0)+t0’0 (t0) = !=h. The monopoly price is ￿0 = ’(t0). Lemma 1 at the end of this proof
shows that the monopoly price is greater than the internal transfer price within the vertically
integrated entity.
The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 4 below. The ￿gure depicts both Bertrand









Figure 4: Monopolistic behaviour of upstream ￿rm
However, (Monopoly pricing, Don’t sell to d1) is not an equilibrium because the
vertically integrated entity has the pro￿table deviation to undercut slightly the independent
upstream ￿rm. By doing so D2 gains all u1’s pro￿ts without changing practically the cost
level of its competitor in the downstream market (i.e. keeping the downstream pro￿ts virtually
unchanged). This reasoning generalises to any price level set by u1 which is greater than its
marginal cost. For any price ￿0 2 (!=h;￿0] charged by the independent upstream ￿rm it is
always pro￿table for D2 to sell to d1 at a price ￿0 ￿ " for some " > 0. Therefore ￿Don’t sell to
d1￿ cannot be an equilibrium action for D2.
Given the argument above the only action of the vertically integrated ￿rm that can be part
of the equilibrium is ￿Sell to the downstream ￿rm d1 at a price equal to the marginal cost￿.
The independent ￿rm u1 is then indifferent to any price (it makes no pro￿ts in any case). The
unique equilibrium is then, by virtue of an argument symmetrical to the one developed above,
to sell the intermediate good at a price equal to the marginal cost. ￿
The next Lemma completes the proof of Proposition 3 showing that the monopoly price
of the intermediate good is greater than the internal transfer price in vertical integration.25
LEMMA 1. The monopoly price is greater than the (marginal) cost at which the
intermediate good is internally transferred from the upstream to the downstream division of
the vertically integrated ￿rm.
PROOF. Monopoly price is generally greater than the marginal cost of the monopolist
(Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 385), i.e. it is greater than the competitive price. Given labour
mobility and homogeneity the equilibrium wage is unique in our model. Therefore, the
marginal cost of production of the intermediate good is equal for the two upstream plants.
Thus we can conclude that ￿0 > !=h = w=h. ￿
Let us now conclude the analysis of the unobservable-entry case of the asymmetric
con￿guration. Given the equilibrium found in Proposition 3 it is possible to calculate the
equilibrium in the intermediate-good market. The price is then ￿￿ = !/h and the equilibrium














. A fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) is produced by the
integrated ￿rm’s upstream plant and a fraction 1￿￿ by the independent upstream ￿rm. Hence,



































where ￿ ￿2 indicates the labour employed by the vertically integrated entity to serve the





















h (￿(h) ￿ h￿0 (h))
where ￿2 indicates the labour employed to serve the integrated downstream plant. Finally,
recall that the labour demand of the independent downstream ￿rm is ld1 = q￿
d1￿0 (wh=!).
Labour homogeneity and mobility imply that there is only one wage; thus the aggregate
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Since both ￿nal-good producers have the same costs, the equilibrium quantities are equal
q
￿











The competitive wage is then given by the usual condition that equates supply and
demand 2q￿











= a ￿ L
h(2b+v)
2￿(h) (10)
where the subscript A indicates asymmetric con￿guration with observable entry. Equation
(10) determines the equilibrium wage in the unobservable-entry case of the asymmetric
con￿guration. Note that it is identical to equation (5) for the dispersed con￿guration and
to equation (7) for the vertically integrated duopoly.
These results can be summarised in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4. In the equilibrium of the asymmetric con￿guration with unobservable
entry the competitive wage is determined by equation (10).
The comparison of the equilibrium wage level in the unobservable-entry case of the
asymmetric con￿guration with market-clearing wages in the dispersed and in the duopoly
con￿gurations is given by the following corollary.
COROLLARY 2. The competitive wage is equal to the corresponding wage levels of the
dispersed and duopoly con￿gurations.
Note that the inability to commit not to undercut the independent upstream ￿rm’s
monopoly pricing harms the vertically integrated ￿rm. Modi￿cations to the game form would
make the strategy pro￿le (Monopoly pricing, Don’t sell to d1) an equilibrium ￿ in fact the27
unique equilibrium of the subgame. The vertically integrated ￿rm’s choice of serving its
downstream competitor need only be observable by the upstream ￿rm before it chooses the
price. In this game with observable actions the unique equilibrium is indeed that the vertically
integrated entity abstains from serving the independent downstream ￿rm, so as to let the
independent upstream ￿rm monopolise the market for the intermediate good. This is the
subject of the next section.
5.2 The Observable-Entry Case
Quite different results occur when the independent upstream ￿rm has the possibility
of observing whether the vertically integrated entity is active or not in the intermediate-good
market. Two assumptions made in the set-up of the model in Section 2 play a role in producing
this result: the absence of entry in the intermediate-good market and the impossibility for the
independent upstream ￿rm to use a two-part tariff rule such as unitary cost plus a franchise fee
that extracts the pro￿ts from the independent downstream ￿rm. As discussed above, vertical
integration is motivated by the impossibility for downstream ￿rms to initiate bargaining with
suppliers on the price and quantity of the intermediate good.
In the observable-entry case the vertically integrated entity abstains from competing
with the independent upstream ￿rm. It therefore enjoys the fact that it is competing in the
downstream market with a ￿rm with higher marginal costs. Observability makes it possible to
commit not to compete in the input market and thus it sustains the strategy pro￿le (Monopoly
pricing, Don’t sell to d1) as the unique equilibrium in the subgame.





2b one obtains the Cournot equilibrium quantities
qD2 =
2b(a￿cD2)￿v(a￿cd1)
4b2￿v2 and qd1 =
2b(a￿cd1)￿v(a￿cD2)
4b2￿v2 (11)
Consider the independent upstream ￿rm: it observes that the vertically integrated entity
abstains from competing in the intermediate-good market. It thus becomes a monopolist. We
already know that the monopolist’s problem is (8) and its solution is (￿0;t0). Lemma 1 shows
that ￿0 > ￿￿ and hence t0 < t￿.28
The following example shows that with Cobb-Douglas technology it is possible both to
calculate the monopoly price and to show that the solution to the monopolist’s problem always
exists.
Example 2. Using the conditional factor demands, the monopolist’s problem (8)
can be rewritten as:
max
￿ (￿ ￿ !=h)yd1 (w;￿;qd1 (w;￿)) (12)
and monopoly price ￿0 solves the ￿rst-order condition:












By the law of supply, we know that factor demands are downward sloping (i.e. the
necessary condition for the existence of the solution is satis￿ed). Graphically, the
solution is the one depicted in Figure 4 above since equations (8) and (12) describe
the same problem.
Consider again the Cobb-Douglas case: f (yi;li) =
p











































2 + 2vwh￿ = 0 which is a polynomial of the form
￿Ax3 + Bx2 + C where x =
p













h! + 2vw!, all







A > 0 where K :=
3 p




27C2A2 + 4CB3. This also shows that the solution
always exists given the signs of the coef￿cients.
The following proposition characterises the equilibrium of the observable entry subgame
building on the previous discussion.29
PROPOSITION 5. If entry in the market for the intermediate good is observable, then
the upstream division of the vertically integrated entity only performs in-house production
of the intermediate good and leaves the whole market to the independent upstream ￿rm that
therefore acts as a monopolist. In the market for the ￿nal good, D2 competes in quantities with
the independent downstream ￿rm.
PROOF. Given the discussion above one only need show that to ￿￿
D2 > ￿￿
d1. Recall
that Cournot pro￿ts are given by ￿￿
i = b(q￿
i)












2b￿v . Therefore, to show that abstaining
from competition is the equilibrium of the subgame, it is simply necessary to show that
cd1 ￿ cD2 = c(w;￿0) ￿ c(w;w=h) > 0. Downstream production technology is convex and
does not allow for total substitution of one production factor with the other, i.e. li (w;￿;qi) > 0
and yi (w;￿;qi) > 0 for all w, ￿ and qi with i = d1, D2. This implies that using Shepard’s
lemma again the cost function c(w;￿) is strictly increasing in each of the arguments. We have
established in Lemma 1 that the monopoly price of the intermediate good is greater than the
marginal cost of the upstream division of the vertically integrated entity. Hence the average
and marginal cost of the vertically integrated entity is smaller than that of the independent
downstream ￿rm.
11 Finally, the vertically integrated entity is better off when it competes with
a ￿rm which has higher costs than itself than with a ￿rm which has equal costs. This is shown
by the fact that @
@cd1
q￿
D2 > 0. Similarly, the independent downstream ￿rm is worse off than in
any symmetric con￿guration, as @
@cd1
q￿
d1 < 0. Therefore, the equilibrium quantity and pro￿ts
of the vertical ￿rm are greater than those of the independent ￿nal-good producer. ￿
The equilibrium described in the above Proposition 5 completes the analysis of the
subgames.
11 It should be noted that the assumption of a single labour market plays a crucial role in establishing this
result. Indeed, the independent upstream ￿rm reduces its labour demand, thus putting a downward pressure on the
wage. The independent ￿nal-good producer may reduce its labour demand as well, causing a further decrease in
the wage. However, since the labour market is unique the integrated entity will also bene￿t from such a decrease
in the (unique) wage level.30
6. The Merge-and-Compete Game
The analysis of the previous sections establishes the ranking of the pay-offs of the
￿rms in each con￿guration. Thus the reduced form of the merge-and-compete game can be
represented as in Figure 5. Note that observable entry implies that ￿V I > ￿D = ￿d > ￿￿
where the subscripts respectively stand for (asymmetrically) vertically integrated, duopoly,
dispersed and independent downstream ￿rm. Unobservable entry makes the game trivial since






Figure 5: The reduced-form game
Note that in the observability case the strategy ￿Integrate￿ is dominant for both players
and that the pro￿le (Integrate, Integrate) is a strict Nash equilibrium. This establishes the
following result:
12
PROPOSITION 6. The merge-and-compete game in the case of observable entry
has a unique equilibrium which is (Integrate, Integrate). This equilibrium is a strict Nash
equilibrium. However, if entry in the intermediate-good market is not observable, ￿rms are
indifferent whether to vertically integrate or not
Observable entry is a characteristic which is not rare in the real world. If the
intermediate-good market is web-based, the opportunity or otherwise to buy on line the
intermediate good on the website of the vertically integrated entity indicates whether the ￿rm
is indeed active or not in the intermediate-good market. Moreover, competitors might observe
whether or not one ￿rm sells its intermediate goods simply because they can observe the nature
12 The appendix discusses the robustness of the result in Proposition 6 with respect to the wage-setting
institution analysing the case of a monopolist trade union.31
of the output which is shipped from the plants of the vertically integrated entity. A third
example of observable entry is given by the periodical sectoral fairs in which ￿rms launch new
products and present themselves. If intermediate goods are not presented then it is likely that
they will not be sold on the market. These last two examples are very important in the case
of small and medium-sized enterprises which are ￿ as mentioned in the introduction ￿ often
clustered in industrial districts and regularly participate in business fairs.
It is interesting to note that the strategic incentives for vertical integration are found
in the context of perfect and symmetric information about the opponent’s moves rather than
in the unobservability scenario. As a matter of fact, it might have been more intuitive to
obtain a result stating that players had an incentive to merge vertically if their actions were
not observable by competitors. However, the reason why the vertically integrated entity
enters the intermediate-good market in the unobservability scenario is that it ￿cannot resist the
temptation￿ of stealing the market from the independent upstream ￿rm. This makes it clear
why observability sustains the strategic incentives to integrate vertically: it makes it possible
to commit not to compete in the intermediate-good market.
7. Implications for Economic Policy
The analysis above has interesting policy implications. The strategic incentives for
vertical integration found in Proposition 6 are based on the fact that no ￿rm wants to be
the independent downstream producer in the asymmetric con￿guration. However, in the EU
these incentives would be inhibited by the Commission’s competition policy unless the ￿rms
involved were so small as to be subject to national merger control rather than to the EU merger
regulation or even exempt from any merger control because of their (small) size.
According to the EC Merger Regulation,
13 in the case of observable entry in the
intermediate-good market the integrated entity becomes dominant through the vertical merger.
So the European Commission can veto the vertical integration or at least impose a remedy. The
ideal remedy is an obligation for the vertically integrated ￿rm to be active (i.e. to compete)
13 Article 2(3) of the EC Merger Regulation: Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989
on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 395, 30.12.1989; corrected version OJ L 257,
21.9.1990, p.13) with amendments introduced by Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 (OJ L
180, 9.7.1997, p. 1, corrigendum OJ L40, 13.2.1998, p. 17).32
in the intermediate-good market. In the observability case the vertically integrated ￿rm enjoys
a larger market share in the downstream market than the independent downstream ￿rm and
almost drives it out of the market. This is due to the fact that it abstains from competing in
the intermediate-good market. It is exactly this abstention from competition that creates the
dominant position of the vertically integrated ￿rm which is what the Commission is concerned
about. The Commission’s action is legitimised
14 by the fact that consumers are worse off in the
relevant market, which is the ￿nal-good market in the model. Indeed, prices for both varieties
of ￿nal goods increase; moreover, the ￿rst variety (the one produced by the independent
downstream ￿rm) becomes rarer and in our model consumers value variety.
RecentlytheTetra/LavalmergerwasnotapprovedbytheCommissionusinganargument
similar to the one developed in this paper since it was also argued that it threatened to indirectly
create a dominant position. Indeed, our model suggests that a merger may distort competition
indirectly, i.e. through alteration of the strategic behaviour of other market participants even if
the vertically integrated entity does not behave anticompetitively.
According to the Commission’s decision C (2001) 3345 ￿nal of 30 October 2001 not
only was the merger (directly) creating a dominant position ￿ i.e. directly harming competition
￿ its indirect consequences were also detrimental for competition in the relevant markets.
The Court of First Instance did not con￿rm
15 the Commission’s decision, af￿rming that the
Commission had failed to provide suf￿cient evidence in support of its claim. However, it did
state that the latter’s reasoning was perfectly legitimate and correct in addressing the issue of
the future and mediate (i.e. indirect) effects of a merger.
16 The Tetra/Laval judgement was
therefore interpreted as the Court’s establishing standards of proof higher than those used by
the Commission.
17
14 According to article 2(1)(b) of the EC Merger Regulation.
15 Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV vs Commission of the European Communities, 25 October 2002.
16 This is explicitly stated in the Court of First Instance’s press release no. 87/02.
17 In support of this interpretation see the wording used by the Court of First Instance in the judgment on the
Tetra Laval case (T-5/02). In particular recital 336 thereof, which carries the conclusions on the conglomerate
effects states that the Commission’s ￿contested decision does not establish to the requisite legal standard￿ that
the merger would have anticompetitive effects.33
Finally, consider the United States of America where only active, or intentional,
monopolisation of a market is prohibited under the Sherman Act.
18 There, the strategic
incentives for vertical integration given by Proposition 6 hold. Indeed, the independent
upstream ￿rm does not attempt to monopolise the intermediate-good market but simply ￿nds
itself alone in the market because the vertically integrated entity voluntarily abstains from
competing. Moreover, the independent upstream ￿rm is by no means building barriers to entry
in order to preserve its monopoly. On these grounds, the Sherman Act does not condemn the
monopolisation of the intermediate-good market.
8. Conclusions
It is known that merging ￿rms’ performance generally declines in the post-merger
period. The research of this paper is motivated by the following puzzle: why do ￿rms merge
if it is not pro￿table to do so? For this purpose we identify a possible new driver for vertical
mergers: strategic incentives.
A simple model of four plants is analysed, in which none of the traditional reasons
for vertical integration (such as scale or scope economies, transaction costs, incomplete
contracts, input customisation, market foreclosure and double marginalisation) holds; here,
vertical mergers only respond to purely strategic motives. The two upstream plants produce a
homogeneous good that is a necessary input for downstream production. The two producers of
the horizontally-differentiated ￿nal good compete in quantities, while upstream ￿rms compete
in prices.
In the model, downstream ￿rms simultaneously have the opportunity to take over
one input supplier. The resulting vertical integration is observed. Before production and
competition take place, vertically integrated entities decide whether to enter the intermediate-
good market or to perform only in-house production. Whether this market-entry decision
is observable or not by competitors has a crucial impact on the results. If entry of the
vertically integrated entity in the market for the intermediate good is not observable, ￿rms
are indifferent about vertical integration. However, if the market-entry choice is observable,
18 15 U.S.C.A. § 2. See Motta (2003), pp. 1-21 for a comparative discussion of European and US competition
policies.34
vertical integration is the unique equilibrium of the model. Observability makes it possible for
the vertically integrated entity to commit not to enter the intermediate-good market. Thus in
an asymmetric situation in which one integrated ￿rm competes with a chain of independent
enterprises, theindependent upstream ￿rm becomes amonopolist. This makes theindependent
downstream ￿rm the worst-off and the vertically integrated entity the best-off, giving rise to
the strategic incentives for vertical integration. Indeed, each ￿rm has an incentive to integrate
upstream because vertical integration represents a commitment to a strategy that puts the rival
at a strategic disadvantage.
Observable market entry is not a remote hypothesis. Indeed, it happens all the time in
e-business that everyone ￿ competitors included ￿ can observe what products are being offered
on a ￿rm’s website. A more traditional channel of information ￿ow is the concentration in a
given area of the production plants of all the competitors, allowing direct observation of the
speci￿c nature of the commodities shipped out of the competitors’ plants. Moreover, many
￿rms regularly meet (together with wholesale dealers, suppliers, and other specialised agents)
at business fairs where each ￿rm launches the products it is basing its business plans upon.
The last two examples are of great importance for small and medium-sized enterprises. These
￿rms are often clustered in industrial districts and regularly take part in business fairs.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the European Union’s merger regulation and the US
Sherman Act have different impacts on the strategic incentives for vertical integration found
in the model. The EU regulation would inhibit these incentives while the American anti-trust
authorities would not intervene.Appendix
Monopolist Union
This appendix analyses the merge-and-compete game when the labour market includes
a monopolist union. Let us assume that the wage is negotiated between each ￿rm and a
monopolist trade union that aims to maximise the wage bill and is also endowed with all
the bargaining power. The union maximises the wage bill subject to the aggregate labour
demand by the ￿rms and the condition that ￿rms do not earn negative pro￿ts. The rationale
behind the study of such a different labour-market institution is the comparison of its economic
performance with that of the competitive labour market. Although it can be argued that a
perfectly competitive labour market and a monopolist union are diametrically opposite models,
the interest in doing this exercise lies in the fact that reality falls somewhere between the two.
Indeed, the results of the paper are robust with respect to the institutional set-up of the labour
market.
Labour is homogeneous and perfectly mobile so that the wage is the same both upstream
and downstream, irrespectively of the con￿guration under study. Recall that the aggregate

















In the unobservable-entry case of the asymmetric con￿guration the aggregate labour









The discussion in Sections 2, 3 and 5.1 shows that the equilibrium quantities are equal
in all three con￿gurations and therefore the monopolist union faces the same labour demand.
Let us now calculate the equilibrium wage. Consider, ￿rst, the dispersed con￿guration.
Theonly￿rmsmakingpro￿tsarethedownstreamones. Thus, themonopolistunionmaximises36
the wage bill, anticipating that the upstream workers will also enjoy the same wage, which will




















subject to ￿1 ￿ 0 and ￿2 ￿ 0


























































Consider, second, the vertically integrated duopoly. The monopolist union maximises
the wage bill which is wLD
D (w;q￿
D) = w 2
h￿(h)q￿
D subject to the fact that each ￿rm does not
























exactly as in the dispersed con￿guration.
Consider, third, the unobservable-entry case of the asymmetric con￿guration. The only
￿rms that make pro￿ts are the vertically integrated entity and the independent downstream
￿rm. However, it has been observed above that both producers face the same costs (the same
wage and the same price for the intermediate good equal to its marginal cost) and therefore























Hence the monopolist union simply pools all the workers and maximises the wage




























































Direct comparison of equation (16) with equations (14) and (15) leads to the following
result:
PROPOSITION 7. The wage set by the monopolist union is equal in the
dispersedcon￿guration, intheduopolyandinthenon-observable-entrycaseoftheasymmetric
con￿guration.
Therefore, we can conclude that labour-market institutions do not affect the incentives
for vertical integration ￿ rather the absence of these incentives ￿ in the three cases studied
above.
Unfortunately, if the intermediate-market entry is observable it is not possible to
calculate a close-form solution for the monopolist problem of the asymmetric con￿guration.
Thus, it is not possible to calculate the equilibrium labour demands of the three ￿rms and in
turn one cannot determine explicitly the wage chosen by a monopolist union. However, the
wage-settinginstitutionisnotrelevantindeterminingthequalitativefeaturesoftheequilibrium
of Proposition 5. In fact, in the proof of Lemma 1 ￿ which is the basis for the proof of
Proposition5￿theone-wageresultisusedbuttheactualwagelevelandhencethewage-setting
institution is not relevant provided the wage level does not drive any ￿rm out of the market.
Therefore, the results of this paper are robust with respect to the wage-setting institution.References
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